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Abstract
Under the AKP government, Turkey’s foreign policy towards the 
Western Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, has led 
many analysts to suspect it of possessing neo-imperial, or so-called 
neo-Ottoman, objectives. These suspicions have been compounded by 
the repeated declarations of former Prime Minister Davutoğlu and 
current President Erdoğan that the history and religious identity 
shared by Turks and Western Balkan Muslims forms the basis of both 
Turkish-Balkan relations and a common future. Critical examination 
of official Ankara’s attitudes toward the Western Balkans in general, 
and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, identifies four distinct phases 
in which cultural, historical, and religious appeals morphed into the 
set of distinctive foreign policies. These policies have also been shaped 
by pragmatic pursuits of regional influence, the effects of internal 
(Turkish) transformations, and more recently, the ad hoc policies of 
President Erdoğan. 
This article will reconstruct the development of Turkish foreign policy 
since 1990, from multilateral and soft power efforts to religious and 
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Long before President Erdoğan held a mass electoral rally in 
Sarajevo in 2018, Turkey’s relations in the Western Balkans, and 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter, Bosnia) in particular, 
had been noted as a sign of Europe’s weakening influence in 
the region. Along with Russia and China, Turkey is widely seen 
as having filled the vacuum left by the EU (Bassuener 2019; 
Chrzová et al. 2019). Unlike these other aspiring power centres, 
however, Turkey’s renewed presence builds on the historic 
role of the Ottoman Empire in the region and Turkish links to 
Balkan Muslims. 
Beginning in the late 2000s, the assertive foreign policy of 
Turkey began to be seen as a return to more imperial goals 
in the form of neo-Ottomanism (Oktem 2012; Rucker-Chang 
2014). To that end, Erdoğan exploits the historical allure of Pax 
Ottomanica for Balkan Muslims, in order to re-establish a sphere 
of influence in the region based on a “special relationship” 
rooted in culture, religion, and soft-power persuasion. This 
special relationship is frequently evoked by Turkish leaders, 
such as when Prime Minister Davutoğlu praised the Ottoman-
era Western Balkans as a region not on the periphery but at the 
centre of the world’s stage and vowed to work towards restoring 
this geopolitical centrality, stability, and prosperity. 
Yet, nine years later, any promises that Turkey could deliver 
peace and prosperity to the region were brought into question 
by Erdoğan’s 2018 rally in Sarajevo. Held mainly for the Turkish 
diaspora and a domestic audience, the divisive effects of the 
rally raised concerns about the nature of neo-Ottomanism. Is it 
a stabilizing neighbourhood policy, a bid for regional influence, 
or a public relations front for a continued policy of aggressive 
pragmatism? 
While the Ottoman legacy has become part and parcel of 
Turkey’s foreign policy in recent years, the cultural basis for neo-
Ottomanism in the Western Balkans should not be presumed. 
Contrary to the rhetoric of its neo-Ottoman narrative, Turkey 
was in fact absent from the region for most of the 20th century, 
only assuming a more active role during the turbulent 1990s, 
before again strengthening relations with Western Balkan 
states from the mid-2000s. Both of these periods of heightened 
engagement were linked to Islamist influences, but they also 
represented pragmatic opportunities for Turkey to play a key 
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of activist diplomacy under the leadership of the AKP’s Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, the Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister, who 
sought to become a regional powerbroker and lay the ground 
for cultural, religious, and economic ties with the Western 
Balkans. After he left office in 2016, Turkish foreign policy took 
another turn back towards pragmatism and opportunism in 
the wake of a failed coup. 
This article examines the strategies and results of Turkish 
neo-Ottomanism. After presenting an analysis of the main 
phases of Turkish foreign policy towards the Western Balkans, 
the tools and limits of Turkish soft power in the region will be 
discussed. Finally, this analysis will consider recent changes 
in Turkey’s approach to foreign policy in the aftermath of the 
2016 coup attempt.  
The four phases of modern Turkish Involvement in the 
Western Balkans and in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The relations of Turkey with the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia can be divided it into four distinct periods, 
beginning after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It was only then 
that Turkey re-engaged in the region, somewhat tentatively, 
having kept its distance for the first 70 years of the modern 
republic. The second phase of these relations was marked by 
Turkey’s active support for Western policies amidst the wars of 
the 1990s, within the Euro-Atlantic framework. After a short 
period of passivity, Turkey again asserted itself in the Western 
Balkans in a third phase of engagement that followed the 2002 
ascent of the AKP, and was especially active from 2009 to 2015 
when Davutoğlu worked to reorient Turkish foreign policy. 
The fourth phase has aligned with the reassertion of President 
Erdoğan’s leadership since the 15 July 2016 failed coup, and 
his highly pragmatic, some would say opportunistic, style of 
politics. 
1922–1992: distance as policy
Even before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman 
court in Constantinople had largely abandoned Balkan Muslims 
following the Berlin Congress. Then, upon the founding of 
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actively sought to distance the Republic from its Ottoman past 
– politically, culturally, and religiously – including by fully 
disengaging from former Ottoman possessions. For 70 years, 
from 1922 to 1992, Ankara was fundamentally disinterested in 
the Balkans and nurtured no ties with Muslim communities 
in the region. 
Historical ties to Balkan states were also denied within the 
Republic. Turkey hosted hundreds of thousands of Balkan 
Muslims that f led during the Ottoman retreat or in its 
aftermath, yet only a small minority retained their Bosniak, 
Albanian, or Pomak identities. Unlike the Ottoman Empire 
beforehand, the objective of the Republic was to fully assimilate 
these Balkan Muslims into the Turkish national corpus. And, 
while earlier refugees had settled in more or less compact 
settlements in Western Anatolia, exiles from the Kingdom, and 
later Republic, of Yugoslavia were scattered throughout Turkey 
(Mujadžević 2017: 54). 
Since these Muslim emigrants from the Balkans often 
relocated en masse, from extended families to entire villages, 
they maintained few ties with the region. Combined with 
the policy of Turkification they encountered inside Turkey, 
which was implemented in earnest in the early years of the 
Republic, their former cultural and linguistic identities were 
essentially erased. Thus, of an estimated 350,000 to four million 
Turks of Bosniak origin, very few speak the Bosnian language 
(Mujadžević 2017: 53).
The secularist policies of the Turkish Republic also left Balkan 
Muslims seeking religious instruction in other parts of the 
Muslim world. Atatürk’s opposition to religious education 
and the diminishing public role of religion in the country, 
which culminated in the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate 
in 1924, motivated Bosnian and Albanian Muslims to pursue 
their religious educations in Cairo, Damascus, or Sarajevo; and 
after WWII, in Libya, Saudi Arabia, or Iraq. In fact, the number of 
religious students in Istanbul, Ankara, or Konya was minimal 
until the rise to power of the AKP, when Balkan Muslims finally 
began returning to Turkish religious institutions. 
After WWII, Turkish foreign policy was focused on maintaining 
a firm alliance with the United States, and the agenda was 
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Union and the installation of the new world order, however, 
Ankara began reasserting itself as an increasingly prominent 
player on the world stage. Yet, in the early 1990s, under 
President Turgut Özal, Turkey sought to gain influence not 
in the Balkans, but in the formerly Soviet republics of Central 
Asia. Özal foresaw opportunities in this Turkic region, with 
which Turkey shared a certain measure of linguistic, cultural, 
historical, and religious identity (Larrabee 2003: 99-126). The 
first Turkish strategic endeavour in Central Asia that was truly 
independent of the United States was nevertheless countered 
by pro-Russian resistance and eventually ended in failure; and 
Turkey only managed to exert a strong influence in Azerbaijan, 
its closest neighbour, both territorially and linguistically.
The 1990s: the era of Atlanticism 
Turkey finally became involved in the wider Balkan region 
when war broke out in the early 1990s, showing a particular 
interest in Bosnia. The plight of Bosnian, and later Kosovar, 
Muslims attracted the attention of Turks and inspired their 
solidarity, especially among those who traced their roots to 
Balkan states. Islamist parties also used the circumstances to 
raise their political profiles and gain legitimacy. 
On top of this, the role of the United States in propping up 
the central Bosnian government late in the war called for the 
inclusion of allies considered friendly to the Bosniaks. Turkey 
responded positively and became an active participant in the 
international community’s policy towards Bosnia and Kosovo 
in the 1990s. However, this was also a time of considerable 
internal political upheaval in Turkey, which limited the ability 
of its government to successfully formulate foreign policy vis-à-
vis the crisis in the Western Balkans. This constrained Turkish 
action to diplomatic activities undertaken within the Euro-
Atlantic multilateral framework, under US leadership.
At the beginning of the war in Bosnia, in April 1992, the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly sent a fact-finding commission, 
which called for the provision of humanitarian aid to Bosnian 
citizens (Busra 2013). In 1993, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu 
Ciller implored the international community to lift the arms 
embargo against Bosnia, and in February 1994, he paid a 
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Pakistan Benazir Bhutto (Busra 2013). The Turkish government 
then engaged in two rounds of forceful diplomacy to assist 
the government in Sarajevo. Working in concert with the 
Americans, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin visited 
Bosnia and Herzegovina twice to help convince Bosnian 
leadership to join diplomatic efforts meant to reconcile conflict 
between the Bosniaks and Croats, thereby contributing to the 
signing of the Washington Agreement in 1994. 
Turkey was also involved in supplying arms to Bosnia (Vračić 
2016: 8), though it did not lead these efforts. Turkish leaders 
worked with other Muslim actors in the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) to respond to the failure of the West 
to protect Bosniaks from ethnic cleansing as well, producing a 
number of resolutions in support of the Bosnian government. 
This included the 1995 Conakry resolution, which reaffirmed 
that OIC states were not obliged to respect the “illegal and 
unjust” arms embargo imposed on Bosnia (Karčić 2013: 334).
Despite these activities, Turkey was criticized, even within 
its own borders, for doing too little to assist the Bosnian 
government during the war. Many felt the Turkish government 
had especially failed Bosniak refugees, hundreds of thousands 
of whom were welcomed and cared for by countries in Western 
Europe, while only some 20,000 were officially accepted by the 
Turkey (Mujadžević 2017: 56). Moreover, Turkish leaders chose 
not to provide these refugees with refugee status, insisting 
they were guests (musafir) and absolving the government of any 
financial and legal responsibility that would otherwise arise 
from international legal obligations (Busra 2013). 
In this way, Turkey’s participation in diplomatic, humanitarian, 
and stabilization efforts in both Bosnia and Kosovo was of an 
auxiliary diplomatic and military nature, and fully within 
the framework of Atlanticism. While Turkey failed to develop 
a greater independent initiative, this engagement did allow 
it to assume a role in Western alliances and in long-term 
stabilization programmes in the Balkans. The Turkish Army 
has been engaged in small numbers across the Balkans since 
then, and Turkey has become part of the Peace Implementation 
Council, the South East European Cooperation Process, the SFOR, 
and other EU and UN led structures. Still, following the end of 
war in Bosnia and the intervention in Kosovo, Turkey largely 
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Macedonia within multilateral military structures in the 2000s 
(Vračić 2016: 18). 
2003–2016: foreign policy activism under the AKP 
Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans took on a new 
assertiveness under the AKP government, which increasingly 
legitimized its interest in regional countries on the basis 
of both cultural and historical ties. As President’s Erdoğan 
spokesman Ibrahim Kalin put it, “No Turk considers Sarajevo, 
Mostar, Pristina, Skopje or Novi Pazar distant places. Balkan 
Muslims feel the same about Istanbul, Bursa, Konya and cities 
in Anatolia” (Kalin 2018). 
This shift in Turkey’s foreign policy was facilitated by two 
key changes within the AKP. First, emboldened by successive 
electoral successes in 2007 and 2008, the AKP felt free to 
advocate a more conservative political platform that openly 
employed religious language and imagery. At the AKP congress 
in 2012, Erdoğan further emphasized common Islamic identity 
as a basis for foreign policy (Mujadžević 2017: 75). Second, 
between 2009 and 2015, Turkish foreign policy was led by the 
visionary Ahmed Davutoğlu. In his manifesto, Strategic Depth, 
written when he was still an academic, Davutoğlu articulated 
a foreign policy that reflected the ideological stance of leaders 
in the Özal era, who embraced a Turkish-Islamic synthesis. This 
perspective was gradually adopted by Turkish elites, who no 
longer viewed Islam as a challenge to a secular republic but as 
an element of Turkish national identity. 
Davutoğlu saw both Islamic identity and Ottoman history as 
resources for a more assertive Turkey, which sought to build 
its role as a regional power. The Balkans in general, and Bosnia 
in particular, represented areas of particular interest for 
Davutoğlu; but it was solidarity with Bosnian Muslims in the 
1990s, when Erdoğan was Mayor of Istanbul, that gave Turkish 
Islamists an opportunity to advance this objective. Islamists 
seeking to claim a special role in international relations used 
this solidarity to inspire mass mobilizations, and since this 
time, Bosnia has remained (along with Gaza, Kashmir, etc.) a 
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Between 2009 and 2015, under Davutoğlu – first in his capacity 
as chief foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Erdoğan and 
then as the Minister of Foreign Affairs – Turkey became an 
increasingly active player in a widening sphere that extended 
from the Central Asian ‘stans’ in the east to North Africa in 
the west to the Western Balkans in the north. While this area 
roughly follows the outlines of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish 
officials reject this comparison. Indeed, during the first years of 
this phase of Turkish foreign policy, the AKP pursued activities 
in the Balkans that were less focused on re-creating past 
relations on the basis of a neo-Ottomanist approach to Muslim 
societies (in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania), instead putting 
their efforts into engaging across the region to secure Turkey’s 
position as a centre of influence. 
The foreign policy of the AKP has maintained this focus on 
achieving influence through regional stabilization efforts, 
economic and strategic investment, and cultural diplomacy. 
In fact, Davutoğlu referred to “Turkey’s primary interests in 
the Balkans” as including activities to help to “normalize 
bilateral relations among the Balkan states, to deepen regional 
integration” (Raxhimi 2011). Beginning in 2009, Turkey thus 
engaged in “hyperactive diplomacy” (Aydıntaşbaş 2019: 20) 
regarding political relations between Bosnia, Serbia, and 
Croatia, with the explicit aim of breaking the political deadlock 
that existed between Bosnia and Serbia. 
After the failure of US-led efforts towards post-Dayton 
constitutional reform in Bosnia, Turkey stepped in to fill 
the void, successfully initiating two trilateral consultation 
mechanisms – one with Bosnia and Serbia, and one with 
Bosnia and Croatia. To that end, Turkish political figures, 
including President Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan, and 
foreign minister Davutoğlu, paid several visits to the Western 
Balkans between 2009 and 2013. Davutoğlu especially 
engaged in shuttle diplomacy, eventually fulfilling three 
highly visible and symbolic objectives: 1) bringing Bosnian 
and Serbian representatives to the same table, 2) obtaining 
a Serbian condemnation of the massacres that took place in 
Srebrenica (albeit without using the term genocide) and an 
official recognition of Bosnia’s territorial integrity, and 3) 
unblocking the appointment of Bosnian Ambassador to Serbia 
Boriša Arnaut. The second of these was achieved through the 
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Turkey, Serbia, and Bosnia, which recognizes and guarantees 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia.
Still, Erdoğan’s diplomatic activity has been most successful 
where least expected – in Serbia, a country long considered 
to have a highly negative view of Turkey – because the Prime 
Minister and then President of Turkey has strategically pursued 
personal relationships with every Serbian president since 2010. 
Notably, he met that year with President Tadić in Srebrenica, 
on the anniversary of the July 1995 genocide. And Erdoğan has 
maintained cordial relations through each subsequent change 
of government in Serbia, including with Prime Minister Ivica 
Dačić and President Tomislav Nikolić. In 2013, when Nikolić 
met with President Gül, the Turkish president forecasted an 
“economic boom” in Serbia and proclaimed the country a “close 
neighbour” to Turkey (Turski predsjednik Gül najavio ‘gospodarski 
bum’ u Srbiji).
Relations between Turkey and Serbia have now reached a new 
peak in the ongoing and very close relationship shared between 
presidents Erdoğan and Vučić. Nevertheless, continued Turkish 
efforts towards multilateralism in the Balkans have had only 
limited results. For instance, when Erdoğan hosted Vučić and 
Bosnian President Bakir Izetbegović in January 2018, he was 
unable to heal any of the fractures that remain in Bosnian-
Serbian relations as a consequence of the past. 
Turkey did succeed in positioning itself as a broker in the 
conflict within Montenegro’s Islamic Community. But after 
this initial success, Turkish ambition to be a broker of stability 
faltered as further initiatives f loundered. Most notably, 
attempts to negotiate an agreement between rival factions 
within the Islamic Community of Serbia failed and led to its 
eventual split. The limits of this arbitration were related to 
perceptions that Turkey’s approach was less than impartial 
(Može li Turska pomiriti muslimane u Srbiji?). The Turkish plan was 
seen as favouring the faction of Zilkić and Ugljanin over that 
headed by Novi Pazar strongman Zukorlić.
2016–present: Erdogan’s post-coup assertion of authority 
Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans changed course 
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Minister Davutoğlu and to the political earthquake that 
followed the attempted military coup in July. The period 
since then has represented a radical departure from a largely 
predictable Turkish foreign policy approach towards the region 
in all previous phases. This new posture is characterized by 
erratic decision making and the authoritarian streak of 
President Erdogan, discussed in more detail in Section 4. 
Turkish soft power in the Western Balkans
By 2010, Turkey had reinvented its political approach to 
the Western Balkans. By leaning into cooperation and culture, 
Ankara had increased its presence in the region over 20 years, 
providing Turkey with significant visibility (Huskić 2020). This 
was facilitated by soft-power activities (Benhaïm, Öktem 2015) 
and by an activist diplomacy increasingly accompanied by 
cooperative efforts in which Turkey appeared to emulate the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (Demirtaş 2015) – from visa-
free relations to cultural diplomacy to religious sponsorship. 
Turkey sought in this way to expand its influence, especially 
among Balkan Muslims, through soft power concentrated 
in four main areas: religious institutions, Islamic history, 
education, and media and popular culture. 
Religion and religious history
Following the political transformation that took place under 
AKP leadership, a main avenue for Turkey’s soft power has been 
its Ottoman Islamic heritage. The relatively pious AKP not only 
replaced the once dominant secular elites who previously 
helmed the state, but also slowly reshaped the role and form 
of religious institutions within Turkey. As prime minister, 
Erdoğan was able to impose a new politics, despite the secular 
military elite, through a series of symbolic changes that 
included lifting the ban on headscarves in universities (in 
2008), allowing religious high school students to be admitted 
to universities (in 2009), and generally increasingly the use of 
religious language in political discourse. He also strengthened 
the Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, or 
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Even before these changes to Turkey’s foreign policy, Turkish 
non-governmental religious groups had established a visible 
presence in the Western Balkans. After the wars in the 1990s, 
several Turkish neo-Sufi and Islamic revivalist movements 
found a home in the region, through Süleymancılar student 
houses, the Menzil Community, and Gülen-run private schools 
(Mujadžević 2017, Solberg 2007, Huskić 2020). In the 2000s, the 
Gülen movement (which members refer to as Hizmet, or service) 
was especially active in building an extensive institutional 
network across Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia. 
These groups, which adhered to a Turkish style of Islam, were 
seen as only marginally motivated by religion; and unlike 
Saudi-linked organizations, known for proselytizing, Turkish 
groups primarily focused on providing quality educational and 
humanitarian services to local communities. Granted, these 
services were coloured by a moralist, quietist, neo-Sufi form of 
Islam. But Turkish groups presented their Islamic tradition as 
broadly identical to local practice. 
Turkish activities in the religious arena, and specifically tied 
to religious heritage, became more visible with the advent of 
the AKP’s assertive foreign policy, which stressed the historical 
inevitability of Balkan-Turkish relations by emphasising a 
shared Ottoman past. The AKP saw the Turkish International 
Cooperation Agency (TIKA) as a primary means to strengthen 
cultural relations, investing more than half its funds into the 
rebuilding or rehabilitation of a number of significant Ottoman 
Islamic heritage monuments that were damaged or destroyed 
in the Bosnian war, from mosques in Banja Luka and Foča, to 
Ottoman-era madrasas, to the old Mostar bridge (Huskić 2020).
Turkey also gained leverage over some Islamic institutions 
through its financial support of efforts to modernize religious 
infrastructure. This included the building of new mosques, 
Islamic centres, and student dormitories, as well as support 
for the cultural and religious activities of official Islamic 
Communities (IC) in the region. Still, some of the initiatives 
financed by Turkish donors were completed independent of 
or despite the intent or planning of these ICs. For example, 
the Turkish municipality of Bursa funded the construction 
of a mosque in central Sarajevo that was situated next to the 
tomb of a popular, recently passed Sufi authority, without first 
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Turkish foreign inf luence in the Western Balkans also 
developed in several more explicitly religious ways under the 
AKP. Early in its administration, the AKP government re-opened 
Turkish Islamic higher education institutions to students 
from both the Balkans and Central Asia and began offering 
stipends for religious study. Like all Islamic policy in Turkey, 
this programme was administered by the Diyanet. 
In the Balkans, the main activity of the Diyanet was selecting 
students for Turkish scholarships (Solberg 2007), and it was 
thus considered to have “only limited impact” when it came to 
exerting Turkish influence in comparison to private Turkish 
Islamic organisations (Sarajlić 2011: 185). But this changed 
after 2009, when the AKP began to see the Diyanet as a key and 
influential conduit of state religious policy within Turkey, on 
top of its efforts abroad. To this end, the Diyanet was developed 
into a centre of religious power and was made directly 
responsible to the prime minister (Öktem 2010: 31). 
This new role of the Diyanet was most apparent in Bosnia, but also 
in Kosovo and Albania; and it was met with some local resistance. 
As Öktem notes, the limits of the AKP’s policy were first apparent 
in Bosnia – the Balkan country with the most institutionalised 
Islamic administration – where, precisely because the Diyanet 
was a powerful state institution, it was not seen by Bosnians as a 
source of religious or spiritual authority (Öktem 2010). Unlike the 
administration of the former Ottoman Caliphate, the Diyanet is a 
sizeable ministerial agency of government, whereas the Bosnian 
reis (the highest elected religious leader among Bosnian Muslims) 
is independent of the state, instead representing a religious 
community. Hence, the practical influence of the Diyanet in the 
Western Balkans grew rather slowly. 
In Bosnia, long-time Bosnian reis Mustafa Cerić (1993-2012) was 
an ambitious religious and political figure who had sought to 
balance foreign support from abroad between the Gulf states, 
Turkey, Europe, and even Libya. While he was close to Diyanet 
leadership, he fell out with Turkey over its policy towards 
Serbian Muslims (Mujadžević 2017: 113). It was not until after 
the September 2012 election of Husein Kavazović as the new 
Bosnian reis that relations between the IC and Turkey improved, 
and successive heads of the Diyanet have become frequent 
visitors to Bosnia. Moreover, a permanent representative of the 
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Upon entering office, reis Kavazović was able to build upon his 
existing relationships with the Diyanet, thanks to the fact that 
Diyanet leaders have long maintained ties with lower ranking 
Bosnian Islamic officials. For example, Kavazović already 
knew the current President of the Diyanet, Dr. Ali Erbaş, from a 
previous visit Erbaş made to Sarajevo. In a significant gesture, 
Kavazović invited Dr. Erbaş to deliver a Friday khutbah (sermon) 
at Sarajevo’s main mosque, in Turkish, during a March 2018 visit 
by the Turkish prime minister. 
Since the mid-2010s, the Diyanet has also been visible at 
other religious events in Bosnia, including official iftars, 
outdoor prayers, and historical commemorations (Ramazan u 
gradovima BiH 2016). Representatives appear at the openings 
of Turkish investments in Bosnia as well. This presence has 
influenced and altered some existing local customs and rituals. 
Turkish organisations stage highly public ceremonies for the 
circumcision of young boys, for instance, and play Ottoman 
military marches at traditional outdoor prayer events, such as 
the annual “Days of Ajvatovica” – both of which were hitherto 
unknown among Bosnian Muslims. 
Across the Balkans, Islamic Communities actively sought and 
found a certain degree of patronage abroad when they needed 
resources in the 1990s to rebuild community infrastructure 
after the communist era, to establish schools and universities, 
and in Bosnia, to repair the destruction of war; but Bosnia’s turn 
towards Turkey followed what Öktem has called a “Wahhabi 
intermezzo.” The country’s first post-war partners were Gulf 
states, whose presence was criticized as a channel for Salafi/
Wahhabi proselytism. At the time, Turkey was catering instead 
to small Turkish minorities in Macedonia and Kosovo. It was 
only under the AKP that Turkish authorities sought and offered 
collaboration with national Islamic Communities. 
Turkey has since become the main partner of the Islamic 
Community in Bosnia. However, unlike in Bulgaria for 
example, the Diyanet has no direct (or indirect) financial or 
administrative control over Bosnian Islamic institutions, 
though its informal influence is certainly growing. Turkey 
must contend with a highly organised Islamic institutional 
structure in Bosnia, where religious leaders maintain a decades-
long tradition of managing their own religious and external 
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with Islamic institutions in Kosovo and Albania, with arguably 
even less success than in Bosnia. Turkey has reconstructed 
Ottoman era mosques and has proposed the construction of 
new mosques in both Pristina and Tirana, even building the 
largest mosque in the Balkans in Tirana, in the ostentatious 
Ottoman style. Yet, after President Erdoğan personally opened 
it in 2015, the project met with strong local criticism (“Mosqued 
objectives” 2016; Colborne and Edwards 2018).  
Education and the media 
The rise of the Diyanet in both Turkey and the Balkans was 
accompanied by a move towards the convergence of state and 
non-state Turkish Islamic networks (Solberg 2007). Even before 
the foreign policy turn of the AKP, private Islamic organisations 
such as those mentioned above – the Quranic study groups 
of the Suleymancis, the humanitarian Menzil movement, 
and educational institutions of the Hizmet movement – were 
laying the groundwork for a Turkish cultural and religious 
infrastructure in the Balkans. These Neo-Sufi and Islamic 
groups all established religious circles and offered an array of 
services, but the Hizmet was by far the most active. Beginning 
in 1997, it founded a system of primary and secondary schools 
and universities in the Balkans, as it had in Turkey and other 
parts of the world (Knezevic 2016). 
High schools established by Hizmet were regarded as especially 
high-quality institutions to which local elites were happy 
to send their children, including the Bosna Sema school in 
Sarajevo and the Jahja Kemal school in Macedonia. Universities 
launched by Hizmet in the Balkans drew paying students from 
the religious strata in Turkey, especially while the headscarf 
ban in Turkish universities was in force, along with local elite 
and scholarship students. These universities, such as Burch 
in Sarajevo and Epoka or Bedër in Tirana, were more modern 
than state schools and more oriented towards academic output, 
especially in the humanities. 
But aside from its educational offerings, the Hizmet movement 
also represented Turkey, Turkish culture, and Turkish Islam 
abroad, and it funded the translation and publication of texts 
by Said Nursi and Fethullah Gülen that argued for a modern, 
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Parallel to these activities, the movement also published 
weekly magazines in Bosnia (Novo Vrijeme) and Macedonia 
(Macedonia Zaman) and held regular events with local elites to 
share the Hizmet message. In the early 2000s, support for these 
private Turkish educational initiatives and the promotion of 
Turkish Islam flowed from the Turkish administration. In fact, 
President Gül opened the International Burch University in 
Sarajevo in 2010, when private religious actors were still seen 
as crucial to Turkish soft power abroad. 
However, by the late 2000s, AKP leadership began taking more 
direct control of initiatives shaping foreign cultural relations. 
In 2007, for instance, the Yunus Emre Institute (Yunus Emre 
Enstitüsü, or YEE) – the Turkish equivalent of the German 
Goethe-Institut – was founded to offer language courses and 
host cultural events outside Turkey. By 2015, some two dozen 
YEE locations had opened across the Western Balkans, with 
multiple locations in several countries in the region (Turkish 
language courses draw interest in Balkans 2018). In addition to 
offering Turkish language courses, YEE facilitates educational 
initiatives such as the Mevlana Exchange Programme, which 
provides scholarships for exchange students to Turkish 
universities. 
Alongside these state efforts, the AKP engaged businesses close 
to the party in private educational entrepreneurship, resulting 
in the establishment of the International University of Sarajevo 
in 2004 and the International Balkan University in Skopje in 
2006. As this form of AKP-led private activism intensified, 
Bosnia became even more of a focal point. Turkish investors 
founded several influential media outlets in the country, 
under the auspices of Simurg Media, the most prominent of 
which are Stav magazine and the web portal faktor.ba (which 
was originally a daily newspaper before it folded due to low 
circulation). These ventures have strengthened the Turkish 
media presence in Bosnia, previously filled almost solely by 
Turkish news agency Anadolu – which began operating in 
Bosnia in 2012, and broadcasts in local languages. 
Many local news outlets distribute free content from Andalou 
and TRT (Turkish Radio and Television), adding to the space 
Turkish news agencies account for in Bosnia. And since 2015, 
when Faktor and Stav were launched, Turkish media has 
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report on Turkish internal and external policy issues (in a way 
that is highly propagandised), their main focus is on promoting 
the agenda and activities of the leading Bosniak political party, 
the SDA, which receives reliably favourable coverage (Janusz 
2015, Huskić 2020). 
Elsewhere in the Balkans, Turkey has managed to make 
inroads partly by achieving greater viewership for its 
domestic soap operas, which constitute a substantial amount 
of the programming on some channels, including in Serbia 
and North Macedonia (Cabric, et al. 2013). In both of these 
countries, Turkish soap operas are immensely popular, and 
have successfully projected an image of Turkey as modern 
and industrious (Huskić 2020). Together with Turkey’s visa-
free regime and the frequent direct flights offered by Turkish 
Airlines to and from the region, these cultural diplomacy 
initiatives have contributed to bringing Balkan societies closer 
to Turkey. 
Through these various soft power projects, Turkey has 
positioned itself as an influential and desirable neighbour 
to the Balkans. Turkey’s “mosque diplomacy” (Tol 2019) 
and patronage of Islamic institutions has been aided by 
intermediaries such as the Islamic Community; and by offering 
quality private education at all levels, local language media, 
news wires, and popular culture, Turkey has become a major 
player in the region, as well as a major partner to many Balkan 
Muslims, especially in Bosnia. This cultural penetration began 
well before the rise of the AKP, though private initiatives, but 
it certainly intensified in the mid-2010s when AKP-oriented 
companies and state institutions took the foreign policy reins 
from previous non-state actors. 
Limits to the thesis of “Neo-Ottomanism” 
The foreign policy of the AKP in the Balkans has met a mixed 
reception. For some local media and analysts, the term “neo-
Ottomanism” has become a critical descriptor for a Turkish 
foreign policy perceived as high-handed, insincere, and 
Muslim-biased. Yet some Muslims in Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, 
North Macedonia, and the Sandžak region see Turkey as both a 
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Distrust of Neo-Ottomanism
The return of Turkey in its “neo-Ottoman” form has been widely 
discussed by diverse voices. In the West, it has not necessarily 
been described in negative terms. In the Washington Post, for 
example, Michael Birnbaum called modern Turkey a “gentle 
version of the [Ottoman] empire” (2013). Yet in the Balkans, 
after Turkey’s early years of diplomatic activism, strong local 
criticism grew towards what some viewed as a covert neo-
Ottomanist or even Islamist agenda in Turkish activities. In 
this context, careless rhetoric by the highest Turkish officials 
raised suspicions about the AKP’s bias and undermined some 
diplomatic efforts (Aydıntaşbaş 2019). 
To some extent, Turkey may have miscalculated how its 
history would play in the region. National identities in Serbia, 
North Macedonia, and Albania are literally constructed upon 
narratives of liberation from the Ottoman Empire; and in 
Serbia especially, post-Yugoslav nationalism actively revived 
the traumas of Ottoman conquest. It is therefore unsurprising 
that any hints of neo-Ottomanism in Turkish policy have been 
viewed through a highly critical lens in the Western Balkans. 
Moreover, Serbian university lecturer, former diplomat, and 
writer Darko Tanasković has developed an influential discourse 
on Neo-Ottomanism over recent decades, in which he interprets 
the foreign policy of the AKP, as articulated by Davutoğlu, as an 
ideological product of domination. 
Since Tanasković began developing the concept, the question 
of Turkish neo-Ottomanism has been taken up by a wide range 
of media and academic actors in the region. At an April 2011 
conference addressing “New Turkish Foreign Policy in the 
Western Balkans,” organized by the International and Security 
Affairs Centre in Belgrade, Serbian authors Žarko Petrović and 
Dušan Reljić highlighted that careless rhetoric by Turkish 
officials in public diplomacy played a role in reinforcing 
perceptions of neo-Ottomanist intentions. Their criticism 
was especially directed at statements made by Davutoğlu in 
a 2009 speech in Sarajevo, which emphasised the centrality of 
Ottoman heritage: “Our history is the same, our fate is the same, 
and our future is the same. Similar to how the Ottoman Balkans 
[rose] to the centre of world politics in the 16th century, we will 
make [the] Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East, together with 
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occasion, Davutoğlu expressed Turkey’s desire for “a new 
Balkans, based on political values, economic interdependence 
and cultural harmony. That was the Ottoman Balkans. We will 
restore this Balkans. People call this ‘neo-Ottoman’. I don’t point 
to the Ottoman state as a foreign policy issue. I emphasize the 
Ottoman heritage. The Ottoman era in the Balkans is a success 
story. Now it needs to come back” (Malić 2009). As Petrović and 
Reljić noted, Davutoğlu was “not winning the hearts of non-
Muslims in the Balkans” by making such assertions (2011). 
Indeed, this rhetoric by leading AKP figures led to a backlash, 
especially in leading Serb nationalist-oriented media in Serbia 
and in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (RS). In the RS, suspicions about 
Turkey’s neo-imperialism were echoed by the entity’s leader 
Milorad Dodik, who claimed that a “project of Islamisation” in 
Bosnia was being led by Bakir Izetbegović, the Bosniak member 
of the country’s tripartite presidency. Dodik said further that 
he was unsurprised by a highly controversial statement made 
by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan in 2013 that that “Kosovo is 
Turkey, and Turkey is Kosovo.” 
Those who have concerns about Turkish foreign policy under the 
AKP point regularly to Davutoğlu’s 2001 book, Strategic Depth, which 
they consider a blueprint for Turkey’s perceived neo-Ottomanism. 
In it, Davutoğlu envisioned Turkey as among the world’s “central 
powers” and contended that “Turkey should develop a proactive 
policy commensurate to its historic and geographic depth, which 
is amplified by its Ottoman legacy.” Arguing that Turkey aspire 
to become more than a regional player, Davutoğlu made the case 
that the country should play a leading role in all of the multiple 
regions to which it can assert belonging – the Middle East, the 
Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea Basin, the 
Mediterranean, and the Gulf and Black Sea basins. To do this, he 
believed Turkey “should capitalize on its soft power potential (…) 
based on its historic and cultural links with all the regions which 
it belongs to, as well as its democratic institutions and thriving 
market economy” (Grigoriadis 2010).
Turkey’s foreign policy makers themselves have rejected the 
term neo-Ottomanism, as well as the notion that they have any 
grand imperial designs. Davutoğlu addressed the label explicitly 
in 2011, telling an interviewer, “I am not a neo-Ottoman. 
Actually, there is no such policy” (Raxhimi). And indeed, an 
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reveal any cohesive project of neo-Ottomanism with clear goals 
and immediate objectives, or the actions necessary to achieve 
them. Rather, it appears that Turkey has simply exploited the 
existing ties developed on the basis of history and culture by 
Turkish non-state actors since the 1990s, to boost Turkish state 
influence in the Western Balkans. 
In Strategic Depth, Davutoğlu emphasised the importance of 
Turkey finding a way to use soft power to ascend to the status 
of a major power, insisting that “Turkey needs to put aside 
the militaristic image which its strong military and history 
of military tutelage over society and politics has bequeathed. 
Instead, it should promote conf lict resolution, regional 
economic cooperation which would obviate the need for 
regional intervention of great powers” (Grigoriadis 2010). In the 
Western Balkans, local conditions presented an opportunity for 
Turkey, which stepped into the void left by the departure of the 
EU and the US in the late 2000s. In this context it is notable that, 
despite nationalist critiques of neo-Ottomanism, some Serbian 
nationalists have lauded Erdoğan for coming in conflict with 
the EU and have hailed his friendship with Russia (Bechev 2017).
Turkish pragmatism
Beyond taking advantage of existing religious and cultural ties, 
and the draw of Turkish media, Turkey has shown no strategic 
favour to Muslim-dominated areas of the Balkans. To the 
contrary, Turkish trade and military relations follow no clear 
cultural logic but are instead highly pragmatic. According to 
Ibrahim Kalin, an aide to Erdoğan, “Turkey invests in all Balkan 
countries without discrimination in regards to ethnic and/or 
religious identities…. [and] Turkey supports the NATO and EU 
membership process of Balkan countries” (2018). In fact, by 
combining regional stabilization efforts, trade, investment, 
cultural diplomacy, and soft power, Turkish policy in the region 
has emulated the Neighbourhood Policy of the EU (Demirtaš 
2015), without focusing solely on its cultural and historical 
legacy.
In trade, Turkey has signed bilateral free trade agreements with 
every Western Balkan country: with Bosnia in 2003, Albania in 
2008, Serbia in 2009, and Kosovo, FYROM, and Montenegro in 
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partners are not Muslim majority states, but EU members 
(Romania, Slovenia, Greece, and Bulgaria). Trade with these EU 
states accounts for more than two-thirds of Turkey’s exchange 
with the entire region. Indeed, Albania is the only Western 
Balkan country for which Turkey is a top-three trading 
partner; and trade in the region is generally dominated by EU 
countries, most notably Germany, Austria, and Italy. In Bosnia, 
for instance, Germany topped the list of 2018 trade partners 
and Turkey ranked just 7th (Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Relations). 
Still, Turkey’s bilateral economic relations with Montenegro, 
Bosnia, and Serbia are growing. Among these, Turkish 
trade and investments have intensified most significantly 
in Serbia (Geopolitical Futures 2017). But it is Bosnia that 
remains the recipient of the largest “cultural investment” 
by Turkey, through TIKA (Mujadžević 2017). The country’s 
complicated administrative environment and reputation for 
corruption (Lakic and Buyuk 2018) have weakened investment 
opportunities, however, and even with support from both TIKA 
and the state-owned Ziraat Bank, Turkey contributes only 3 
percent of its total investments in Bosnia, where it does not 
figure in the top ten foreign investors (Foreign Investment 
Promotion Agency). 
Turkey appears to favour the ease of relations it enjoys with 
Serbia, which has become its main economic partner in the 
region. While Turkish trade with the Western Balkans grew 
almost tenfold between 2002 and 2016, trade with Serbia 
constituted a third of this and amounted to some 1 billion USD 
(Harper 2018). Serbia is also key to large Turkish infrastructure 
projects in the region with both economic and strategic impacts, 
such as the TurkStream natural gas pipeline (Zuvela 2019) 
and the construction of a Belgrade-Sarajevo highway. Turkey 
pledged to finance this highway at a cost of 3 billion EUR (Lakic 
and Buyuk 2018), but disputes about how the project should 
be implemented have raised new questions about Ankara’s 
visions for the Balkans. In Bosnia, Serbs prefer a northern 
route through the RS, while Bosniaks want the highway to take 
a southern route that will link Serbia’s Muslim majority Novi 
Pazar with Sarajevo (Lakic 2018). 
Other strategic acquisitions by Turkey in the Western Balkans 
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than to develop religious and ideological projects. For 
example, in late 2008, Turkey bought 49 percent of BiH Airlines, 
Bosnia’s national carrier (though the company folded in 2015), 
and Turkish companies have contracted to run Pristina’s 
international airport for the next 20 years, along with airports 
in Skopje and Ohrid. Turkey also funded the construction of a 
key highway linking Kosovo to Serbia and Albania, and plans 
to build part of the planned 445 km highway that will stretch 
from Belgrade to Bar, Montenegro. 
Moreover, although business confidence in Turkey has eroded 
since 2009 due to the 2008 global economic crisis, the 2016 
attempted coup, and the falling lira, Turkish exports to the 
Balkans increased in 2018. Ideology and historical heritage 
clearly play a minimal role in these recent Turkish trade and 
investment decisions in the region, and in Turkey’s foreign 
policy; for, while Serbia is the country most critical of perceived 
neo-Ottoman tendencies, it has nonetheless become Turkey’s 
main partner in the Western Balkans. It seems Turkish policy 
in the region may have been one of pragmatism all along. 
In fact, by 2011, Davutoğlu had called Turkey and Serbia “key 
partners for peace and stability in the Balkans,” noting “a 
common will and desire to forge a strategic partnership” 
(Raxhimi). The reasons for this are obvious. Serbia is the largest 
country in the Western Balkans, and a neighbour to the EU, 
and it put great effort into attracting investments. Further, its 
vertical administrative and political environment is familiar 
to Turkey and thus a “suitable place for Turkish entrepreneurs’ 
business mentality” (Harper 2018). Of course, this does not mean 
Turkey is opposed to using the embrace of Muslim-dominated 
countries in the region to strengthen its political and cultural 
influence, and to translate this influence into strategic leverage 
in this geopolitically important area, seen as a gateway to 
Europe. Yet, Turkey continues to do this within a framework of 
Atlanticism and continues to support the accession of Western 
Balkan countries to both the EU and NATO.
Post-2016 policy: the AKP, Gülen, and an end to Grand Strategies
The fourth phase in Turkish relations in the Balkans has 
followed the breakup between the 2016 AKP and Fetullah Gülen’s 
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that affected foreign policy. While the direction of this policy 
has not shifted course, its style has changed substantially. 
Turkish foreign policy is now marked by the ascendance of an 
authoritarian president who uses international relations for 
domestic consumption and embeds domestic priorities into 
foreign relations.
Diplomacy driven by domestic policy 
In 2016, Turkey’s approach to the Western Balkans took a new 
turn for the third time in less than 20 years. First, in May, 
Davutoğlu – the architect of Turkey’s activist foreign policy 
and the Prime Minister at the time – resigned. Then, in July, 
a failed military coup fundamentally altered modern Turkey. 
President Erdoğan accused the Hizmet Movement and Gülen 
himself of planning to overthrow the government and engaged 
in a systematic and far reaching effort to root out Hizmet 
influencers both in Turkey and abroad. 
Hizmet had facilitated the AKP’s rise to power and its takeover 
of state institutions that Gülenists had populated. But in 
2013, Erdoğan and the AKP moved against their former allies 
following the collapse of the high-profile “Ergenekon” plot, 
which involved a secular “deep state” organisation said to be 
linked to Hizmet members in both the judiciary and police. After 
a failed attempt by the Hizmet-infiltrated prosecutor’s office 
and police to move against corrupt businessmen and officials 
tied to the AKP, the government acted decisively, closing down 
Hizmet-linked schools and businesses and purging the ranks of 
the judiciary and police. This crackdown only intensified in the 
aftermath of the attempted coup in 2016. 
These actions by the government altered the nature of the 
Turkish political system, changed the composition of the 
elite, and redefined the roles of key political actors. Purges of 
business elites and political institutions had not ended with the 
imprisonment and exiling of presumed Hizmet sympathisers, 
but had extended into the AKP itself. Leaders at the highest 
echelons of the party were removed and, for all practical 
purposes, President Erdoğan alone was left in control of the 
AKP and the country. Positions formerly occupied by high-
profile politicians were filled by AKP loyalists and Erdoğan’s 
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Davutoğlu. Policymaking and implementation processes that 
were once complex were replaced in many cases by unilateral 
decision making by the President, followed by implementation 
without examination or criticism. Hence, by 2018, the Turkish 
political system was classified as unfree by Freedom House, 
having ceased to represent the democratic model it held to 
until 2016. These political changes have inevitably affected 
foreign policy, and the Balkans have become a space in which 
Turkey now seeks to fight domestic political struggles and gain 
legitimacy for foreign policies carried out elsewhere. 
This use of international relations for domestic purposes did 
not begin in 2016, though. In fact, many earlier public references 
made by Turkish officials to Ottoman heritage, viewed by some 
in the Balkans as neo-Ottoman, were primarily directed to a 
Turkish audience. On a number of occasions, during elections 
or military campaigns, this ‘domestication’ of Turkish foreign 
policy has clearly been prioritised. In 2014, for instance, Bosniak 
leader Bakir Izetbegović controversially greeted Erdoğan as ‘our 
leader’ by video link from Bosnia during an election rally held 
in Turkey (Bakir Izetbegović: ‘Erdogan nosi zastavu koju je nosio 
pokojni Alija Izetbegović u krvavom BiH ratu’). And in January 2018, 
prominent Sarajevo mosques organised public prayers for the 
success of Turkey’s “Olive Branch” offensive in Syria (U Begovoj 
i Carevoj džamiji u Sarajevu održana molitva za vojnu akciju Turske 
u Siriji). Perhaps most visible, however, was a May 2018 election 
rally in Sarajevo, which was organised by an AKP-linked group 
as a substitute for rallies the AKP was prevented from holding in 
Germany and Austria. The Sarajevo rally was part of the Turkish 
presidential election campaign and was directed at European 
Turks voting in the elections from abroad (Weise 2018). 
Public displays of personal loyalty have also become a more 
noticeable part of Bosnian-Turkish relations, with Muslim 
leaders in Bosnia making their affection for Erdoğan clear 
during his visits and election campaigns, especially since 
the 2016 coup attempt. In turn, Erdoğan has fully supported 
Izebegović in his political campaigns, as has the state-owned 
Anadolu news agency. Erdoğan has developed a similar 
political partnership with Kosovo’s Hashim Thaci (Buyuk 2016) 
and has also cultivated a personal relationship with Albania’s 
Edi Rama – who received an invitation to Erdoğan’s daughter’s 
wedding. Indeed, rather than being driven by Islamist or neo-
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been concentrated on nurturing loyalties and relationships 
with many regional partners.
In Bosnia, the nationalist SDA party and associated media have 
emphasised the link between Bosniaks and Turkey. Local SDA 
groups actively helped promote a book entitled Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan: the Birth of a Leader (Besli and Özbay 2011), and Turkish-
leaning media propagated a story about Bosnia’s wartime 
leader Alija Izetbegović, Bakir’s father, having entrusted Bosnia 
to Erdoğan (Mujadžević 2017). And in 2018, TRT aired a Turkish-
made dramatic mini-series, “Alija,” about the life of Izetbegović. 
Still, Turkey’s support for Bosniak nationalist leaders appears 
to have been driven less by a desire to strengthen Muslims 
in Bosnia than by the personal preferences of Erdoğan based 
on his own considerations and interests. Before backing SDA 
leader Izetbegović, for example, Erdoğan had chosen to back 
his rival Haris Silajdžić, with whom he had developed a close 
relationship in Istanbul. Silajdžić, who won the 2006 election 
with Turkey’s support, was later responsible for stalling the 
unsuccessful push for reforms by the EU and the US, and 
ultimately for their withdrawal. It was only after this that 
Turkey partnered with the SDA.
The effect of the 2016 coup attempt on foreign policy
Erdoğan’s instinct for developing loyalty with other strong 
leaders was mutually beneficial, but at the expense of 
institutional relations. In the aftermath of the failed coup in 
2016, this approach gradually impacted the quality of Turkish 
foreign policy. Quite unambiguously, Turkish priorities in 
relations with Balkan countries began to be defined by the AKPs 
struggle against Hizmet, to the extent that Turkey’s prestige 
and ability to carry out foreign policy were affected. Gülen’s 
movement had once been the vanguard of Turkish soft power 
across the region, and in combination with the foreign policies 
of Davutoğlu, Turkish state agencies and AKP-linked private 
companies had succeeded in building a parallel infrastructure 
of Turkish schools, media, and businesses. But from July 2016 on, 
Turkey has pursued a policy of competition and replacement, 
and no longer by soft means. 
Turkish officials and partners of Erdoğan in the Balkans now 
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term used by AKP leaders. Erdoğan aide Ibrahim Kalin has 
called Hizmet a “cultish belief system” and a threat to Balkan 
countries (Kalin 2018). For several years, Turkish officials from 
ambassadors to Erdoğan himself have demanded that Hizmet-
linked educational institutions in the Balkans be closed down 
and their property transferred to Turkish embassies or other 
proxies of the Turkish state, such as the Maarif Foundation. 
These officials have repeatedly called for the closure of both 
Epoka and Burch Universities, for instance. Turkey has also 
pressed governments in the region to extradite a dozen or more 
people residing in several Western Balkan states (Dizdarevic 
2018; Karaj 2018), including citizens sought by Turkish courts 
for membership in the Hizmet movement (Mejdini 2017). 
In March 2018, this pressure manifested in scandal with the 
outright abduction of six Turkish nationals from Kosovo. 
Among those targeted were a teacher and educational 
administrator, and footage of their arrest went viral in Kosovo, 
where the government faced embarrassment. Prime Minister 
Haradinaj was forced to publicly deny advanced knowledge of 
the operation (Naddaff 2018).
Balkan countries have faced a dilemma when it comes to 
Turkish demands for business closures and extraditions: either 
oblige Turkey, an important partner, in contravention of the 
law; or refuse to comply and safeguard Turkey’s international 
reputation, and thus antagonize Erdoğan. Notably, unlike the 
case in Central Asia, many Balkan governments have resisted 
Erdoğan’s pressure (Erebara 2018). Still, several have offered 
verbal assurances to Turkey or have facilitated compromise 
solutions, such as when the Bosnian Sema schools were 
transferred to a new owner with no Hizmet affiliation. 
The one-sidedness of Turkey’s demands on this issue has led 
to public criticism and even protest. In North Macedonia, for 
example, after the Turkish ambassador claimed the Yahya Kemal 
school in Skopje may be grooming terrorists, parents of students 
replied en masse by posting photos of their children online 
(Turkish ambassador implies Gülen schools in Macedonia raise 
terrorists). And in Albania, the Majority MP refused to oblige 
Turkey in exchange for a new mosque, saying that Albania 
was not a Turkish colony (IPPM 2015). Critical observers in the 
press have also warned Bosnians that President Erdoğan is not 
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It is clear that Turkey’s coordinated campaign to foster the 
loyalty of Balkan leaders has not yielded the results Ankara 
had hoped for, making it difficult for Turkey to leverage power 
through any cultural influence it may maintain. And in some 
places, this approach has plainly backfired by coming off as 
overtly self-serving and raising questions about the motives of 
Turkish foreign policy overall. Moreover, President Erdoğan’s 
style – which prioritises personal relationships over traditional 
institutional channels – has been increasingly on display; 
such as when he hosted Serbian President Vučić along with 
Bosniak SDA leader Izetbegović, instead of inviting the actual 
chairman of the Bosnian Presidency at the time. This style has 
itself limited Turkey’s influence in the region, as Erdoğan has 
mistakenly expected an equivalent of his authoritarianism in 
local leaders. 
According to Dimitar Bechev, Erdoğan appears less motivated 
by a desire to support local Muslims than by his need to mark 
Balkan turf as his, not Gülen’s, and to assert Turkish authority 
among Sunni Muslims specifically (2017). Indeed, the strategic 
turn Turkey took in 2016 revealed that Turkish influence in the 
region is weaker than projected and represents less to fear than 
initially asserted by critics of neo-Ottomanism (Vračić, Ivanović 
and Joseph 2017: 185). For example, Turkey’s continuing efforts 
to engage in mediation in the region have met only limited 
success. Erdoğan has been unable to settle the dispute between 
Bosnia and Serbia concerning the route of the Belgrade-Sarajevo 
highway, Turkey is no longer a player in Kosovo negotiations, 
and it was EU and US diplomats who brokered an end to the 
protracted crisis in North Macedonia.
Conclusion
This critical overview of evolving Turkish policy towards 
the Western Balkans has shown that, since the end of the Cold 
War, successive Turkish leaders have followed their own paths. 
Since the 1990s, Turkey has clearly seen the Western Balkans as 
a region in which its projection of influence is partly facilitated 
by a shared historical narrative, relationships between 
religious institutions, and opportunities for the development 
of friendly relations among political elites. Turkey was first 
spurred to seek a role on the international stage in the context 
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AKP rule, exerting influence in the region was again attractive 
to Turkey when its own EU accession process stalled and it 
observed the EU and US withdrawing from the Western Balkans. 
Yet, none of Turkey’s governments, whether in the secular 
1990s or the moderate Islamic 2000s, has formulated a cohesive 
strategy for dealing with the region. Turkey has succeeded in 
becoming a key player in the Balkans, in terms of multilateral 
politics and economic relations, but not more broadly. Initial 
Turkish successes in other areas have not produced any 
important breakthroughs, such as in addressing the most 
pressing security and development issues facing the region.
Cultural diplomacy was only part of Turkey’s foreign policy 
strategy; yet, during the AKP’s mandate, Turkish foreign policies 
around the world did assume a more ideological dimension, 
with Islamic references featuring prominently in the speeches 
and actions of the country’s leadership. However, any such 
rhetoric not buoyed by consistent financial and political 
support had limited practical effect. And Turkey’s government 
had its limits, too. While Turkey’s state administration became a 
general partner to the Islamic Community in Bosnia in 2013, its 
religious policies were constrained by existing relations with 
Serbia. Ultimately, this support for Balkan Muslim leaders was 
highly visible but fickle, and brought Turkey little authority. 
The resources Turkey has been able to muster when it comes to 
regional trade and investment simply cannot measure up to 
the EU, in terms of financial aid, foreign direct investment, or 
market opportunities. And Ankara’s economic priorities have 
revealed the extent to which Turkish policy is in fact driven less 
by ideology and more by pragmatism. Turkey continues to trade 
at a greater rate with EU members, and larger Balkan countries 
such as Serbia, than with Muslim majority states.
All in all, Turkish foreign policy has been inconstant, with 
sometimes wildly shifting priorities, as seen in the superficial 
and fluctuating support Turkey offered the Bosnian government 
in the 1990s and 2000s. More recently, Turkey’s priorities and 
the focus of its foreign policy shifted again after the 2016 failed 
coup. Yet, the heavy-handed and personalised style of President 
Erdoğan has further limited the effectiveness of this policy as 
well as Turkey’s appeal as a source of stability. For all the grand 
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and his vision of Turkish foreign policy, under the AKP, Turkey 
has failed to provide any meaningful and reliable political or 
economic alternatives to Balkan states. 
Thus, if neo-Ottomanism is deployed by Turkey, it seems to be 
only one of many foreign policy instruments and appears to be 
used only in countries where Turkish officials believe they can 
build upon a cultural sameness, that is, in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Even there, though, neo-Ottomanism does not play significantly 
into Turkey’s foreign-policy outlook. Instead, Turkish foreign 
policy is largely guided by pragmatism, realism, and lately, 
domestic policy.
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